Minamata Disaster

TED Case Studies

Minamata Disaster

     CASE NUMBER:        246
    CASE MNEMONIC:      MINAMATA
    CASE NAME:          Minamata, Japan Disaster

I.  IDENTIFICATION

1.  The Issue

Over 3,000 victims have been recognized as having "Minamata
Disease".  It has taken some of these people over thirty years to
receive compensation for this inconceivable event.  In 1993, nearly
forty years later, the Japanese courts were still resolving
suitable compensation for the victims.  Many people have lost their
lives, suffered from physical deformities, or have had to live with
the physical and emotional pain of "Minamata Disease".  This
suffering is all a result of the very wrongful and negligent acts
of the Chisso Corporation who dumped mercury into the sea water and
poisoned the people of Japan.

2.  Description

Minamata is a small factory town dominated by the Chisso
Corporation.  The town faces the Shiranui Sea, and Minamata Bay is
part of this sea.  In Japanese, "Chisso" means nitrogen.  The
Chisso Corporation was once a fertilizer and carbicle company, and
gradually advanced to a petrochemical and plastic-maker company.
From 1932 to 1968, Chisso Corporation, a company located in
Kumamoto Japan, dumped an estimated 27 tons of mercury compounds
into Minamata Bay.  Kumamoto is a small town about 570 miles
southwest of Tokyo.  The town consists of mostly farmers and
fisherman.  When Chisso Corporation dumped this massive amount of
mercury into the bay, thousands of people whose normal diet
included fish from the bay, unexpectedly developed symptoms of
methyl mercury poisoning.  The illness became known as the
"Minamata Disease".  The mercury poisoning resulted from years of
environmental destruction and neglect from Chisso Corporation.

In 1907 the villagers of Minamata convinced the founder of Chisso
Corporation to build a factory in their town, hoping to benefit
from the wealth of industrialization.  The owner, Jun Noguchi
agreed to the development, but used the people from Minamata as
simple factory workers  The more elite positions, such as engineers
and managers were "imported" as he termed it, from the finest
universities, like Tokyo University.

By 1925, the Chisso Corporation was dumping waste into Minamata Bay
and destroying the fishing areas.  The theory behind Noguchi's
industry was to pay off the Minamata fisherman in exchange for
damaging their fishing environment.  According to Eugene Smith's
interview of the people who lived in Minamata, the company believed
that it was much cheaper to pay off the few people who were opposed
to the dumping, rather than implement an environmentally safe
technique of waste removal.  Therefore, since the villagers
accepted this practice through compensation of money, and the
government was behind the industry, the entire process appeared
ethical.

Chisso Corporation started developing plastics, drugs, and perfumes
through the use of a chemical called acetaldehyde in 1932.
Acetaldehyde is produced using mercury as a compound, and was key
component in the production of their products.  The company was
considered an economic success in Japan, particularly because it
was one industry that maintained development despite Japan's
suffering throughout and right after W.W.II.  As other companies
economically ripened during Japan's post-war period, so did the
Chisso Corporation.  Sales augmented with Japan's economic success.
In addition, Chisso Corporation's sales increased dramatically,
considering Chisso was the only manufacturer of a primary chemical
called D.O.P, a plasticizer (diotyl phthalate).  Having a monopoly
on the chemical enabled Chisso to expand rapidly.  Since Chisso
Corporation was the main industry in the small Minamata town, the
town's growth period from 1952 to 1960 paralleled Chisso's
progress.

Not until the mid-1950's did people begin to notice a "strange
disease".  Victims were diagnosed as having a degeneration of their
nervous systems.  Numbness occurred in their limbs and lips.  Their
speech became slurred, and their vision constricted.  Some people
had serious brain damage, while others lapsed into unconsciousness
or suffered from involuntary movements.  Furthermore, some victims
were thought to be crazy when they began to uncontrollably shout.
People thought the cats were going insane when they witnessed
"suicides" by the cats.  Finally, birds were strangely dropping
from the sky.  Series of these unexplainable occurrences were
bringing panic to Minamata. 

Dr. Hajime Hosokawa from the Chisso Corporation Hospital, reported
on May 1, 1956 that, "an unclarified disease of the central nervous
system has broken out".  Dr. Hosokawa linked the fish diets to the
disease, and soon investigators were promulgating that the sea was
being polluted by poisons from the Chisso Corporation.  The Chisso
Corporation denied the accusations and maintained their production.
However, by 1958, Chisso Corporation transferred their dumping from
the Minamata Bay to the Minamata River hoping to diminish
accusations toward the company.

The Minamata River flows past the town Hachimon, and into the
Shiranui Sea.  The people of this area also began developing the
"strange disease" after a few months.  The Kumamoto Prefecture
government responded by imposing a ban which allowed fisherman to
"catch" fish, but not to "sell" fish from the bay.  Since this was
their main food source, the people continued to eat fish at home,
but the ban released government officials from any responsibility
for those who developed the illness.

Finally, in July 1959, researchers from Kumamoto University
concluded that organic mercury was the cause of the "Minamata
Disease".  A number of committees, of which Chisso Corporation
employees were members, formed to research the problem.  The
committees denied this information and refuted the direct link of
mercury to the strange disease.  Finally, Dr. Hosokawa performed
concealed cat experiments in front of the Chisso Corporation
management, and illustrated the affects of mercury poisoning by
feeding the cats acetaldehyde.  Dr. Hosokawa was the first person
who made a valiant effort in proving to Chisso Corporation that
they were the ones accountable for the mercury poisoning.  After
the meeting with Chisso officials, Dr. Hosokawa was restricted from
conducting any further research or experiments, and his findings
were concealed by the corporation.

Chisso Corporation began to make deals with the victims of the
"Minamata Disease".  People who were desperate and legally ignorant
signed contracts which stated that Chisso Corporation would pay
them for their misfortunes, but would accept no responsibility.  In
fact, there was even a clause which read, "if Chisso Corporation
were later proven guilty, the company would not be liable for
further compensation". 

The fishermen began protesting in 1959.  They demanded
compensation, but soon became intimidated by the threats of Chisso
management.  The victims feared that if they did not settle, they
would never receive any kind of compensation.  Chisso paid off some
of the people while continuing to profit from increased sales.
Chisso installed a "Cyclator" which was designed to treat waste
water.  The management however, often ignored this crucial step in
their production process.  Not until 1968, did Chisso Corporation
quit poisoning the waters in Minamata.  The company was forced into
court in 1969, and the only reason why the polluting stopped was
simply because the method of mercury production became outdated.
It was later determined in court that Chisso Corporation
consistently polluted the waster of Minamata Bay from 1932-1968. 

By 1974 only 798 victims had been officially recognized as having
"Minamata Disease".  Approximately 3,000 more people were waiting
verification from the board of physicians in Kumamoto Prefecture.
Thousands of people continue to eat fish from the Shiranui Sea, but
there are no reportings of significant health hazards or mercury
poisoning like those people who suffered in Minamata.  In 1993,
almost forty years later, victims were still being compensated for
damages.

3.  Related Cases

    BHOPAL case
    DOOSAN case
    KAIDA case

    Keyword Clusters   
    (1): Forum                    = JAPAN
    (2): Bio-geography            = TEMPerate
    (3): Environmental Problem    = MANUFacture


4.  Author  Angie Littlefield   

B.  LEGAL CLUSTER

5.  Discourse and Stage:  DISagree and COMPlete

Victims are still in the process of suing Chisso Corporation for
damages.  The Japanese government is attempting to help Chisso
Corporation from going bankrupt, but Chisso Corporation is already
in substantial debt from paying past victims. 

6.  Forum and /Scope: JAPAN and UNILATeral

    The Kumamoto District Court, Japanese government, and Central
Pollution Board are all involved in the case.  The courts in
Kumamoto District determined rulings for the hearings.  Victims
testified their cases at the UN Environmental Conference in Sweden,
but the UN did not intervene.

7.  Decision Breadth: 1

8.  Legal Standing:  Law

On March 20, 1973, Japan's Kumamoto District Court ruled:

    "It must be said that a chemical plant, in discharging
    the waste water out of the plant, incurs an obligation to
    be highly diligent; to confirm safety through researches
    and studies regarding the presence of dangerous
    substances mixed in the waste water as well as their
    possible effects upon the animal, the plan, and the human
    body, always availing itself of the highest skill and
    knowledge; to provide necessary and maximum preventive
    measures such as immediate suspension of operation if a
    case should arise where there be some doubts as to
    safety... in the final analysis...no plant can be
    permitted to infringe on and run at the sacrifice of the
    lives and health of the regional residents.

    The defendant's plan discharged acetaldehyde waste water
    with negligence at all times, and even though the quality
    and content of the waste water of the defendant's plan
    satisfied statutory limitations and administrative
    standards, and even if the treatment methods it employed
    were superior to those taken at the work yards of other
    companies in the same industry, these are not enough to
    upset the said assumption...the defendant cannot escape
    from the liability of negligence". 

C.  GEOGRAPHIC FILTERS

9.  Geography

     a.  Geographic Domain:       Asia
     b.  Geographic Site:         East Asia
     c.  Geographic Impact:       Japan

10.  Sub-national Factors:  No

The waters and marine life were affected by the waste dumping of
Chisso Corporation.  Minamata Bay is a rich fishing and farming
village.  Therefore, when the water was polluted, it had a dramatic
effect on the main resource of Minamata.  The issue was decided by
Kumamoto District Court.

11.  Type of Habitat:  Ocean

Minamata is known for its marine life, and is a fishing village.

D.  TRADE FILTERS

12.  Type of Measure:  REGSTD

13.  Direct vs. Indirect Impacts:   IND

14.  Relation of Measure to Impact

     A.  Directly Related to Product:  Yes - mercury
     B.  Indirectly Related to Product:  No
     C.  Not Related to Product:  No
     D.  Related to Process:  Yes - fishing

15.  Trade Product Identification: PLASTic

16.  Economic Data

17.  Degree of Competitive Impact:  High

The many years of dumping was extremely costly to the Minamata town
and Chisso Corporation.  Chisso lost money in boycotts of their
products, in compensation to the victims, and in the overall stress
to the company as a result of the mercury scandal.  There is no
known figure on exactly how much money Chisso paid to the victims.
The payment was in the millions, and people are still fighting for
money today.  In addition, the people who were fishermen in
Minamata suffered greatly since they had no source of income when
the waters were poisoned.  Minamata was known as a fishing town,
and the ocean was their main environmental resource.  When the
water became polluted, they could no longer depend on this as a
viable resource, and had no other way to make a living.   

18.  Industry Sector:  (N)  [PLAST]

19.  Exporter and Importer: Japan and MANY

E.  ENVIRONMENT FILTERS

20.  Environmental Problem Type:  Pollution Sea [POLS]
The mercury affected both the marine life and the people of
Minamata.  Because the water was contaminated, eating the fish
caused mercury poisoning in people, cats, and birds.

21.  Species Information

    Name:          MANY
    Type:          MANY
    Diversity:     ?

22.  Impact and Effect: HIGH and PRODuct

23.  Urgency and Lifetime: HIGH and 10-20 years

Chisso Corporation no longer uses the chemicals which caused
"Minamata's Disease", or dump any kind of waste into the bay.
However, the victims have not received full retribution.  Some
people of Minamata are still trying to sue for monetary
compensation from Chisso Corporation.

24.  Substitutes:  Bio-Degradable [BIODG]

Chisso Corporation has implemented environmentally safe technology
in their production process.  The factory quit using the mercury
method of production in 1968, because the system became outdated.

F.  OTHER FACTORS

25.  Culture:  Yes

     Although cultural factors did not play a direct role in the
dispute between Chisso Corporation and the "Minamata Disease"
victims, it did have an indirect impact.  Traditionally, Japanese
people are known to be culturally humble and loyal.  Humility and
loyalties are virtues which are part of Japanese religious
background.  In the Confucian ethic, humility is a honorable
attribute, and people are expected to be loyal and show respect to
their elders.  This relates to the Minamata victims, because it was
the Japanese humility which kept them from initially pressing
charges against Chisso Corporation.  The Japanese people most
likely did not want to believe that a company would intentionally
dump waste into their fishing waters, and then out rightly deny the
accusations.  Another example is Dr. Hosokawa's loyalty.  Dr.
Hosokawa was the first person to prove that Chisso Corporation was
responsible for dumping the mercury, but his loyalty to his company
kept him quiet.  It was noted by researchers that he was internally
tormented by knowing this information, but felt he could not say
anything.  Finally, on his deathbed, Dr. Hosokawa testified to the
court that Chisso Corporation knew their waste dumping had caused
the mercury poisoning.  His statements were crucial to the courts
final verdict in 1973.

     In sum, cultural explanations can help illustrate why the
Minamata cases have prolonged over the years.  The legal system in
Japan is much different than the United States, and this case is
unusual compared to the norm.  Furthermore, Japanese citizens feel
a loyalty to their government and to their companies.  These people
were outwardly victimized by an authority figure which is quite
uncommon in Japanese culture.       

26.  Human Rights:  Yes

The people in Minamata and Niigata have suffered from gross
deformities, brain damage, and death.  The health problems are
endless, and people are still suffering.  This case is definitely
a human right violation.  Chisso Corporation may have not realized
the effects of mercury poisoning, but they negligently dumped waste
into the water.  The company also denied their negligence and tried
to misrepresent their accountability.  Therefore, not only were the
people violated physically, but the victims were disregarded
mentally.

27.  Transboundary Issues:  Yes

The company supplied a chemical called diotyl phthalate, D.O.P.,
which many other factories need for their goods.  Therefore, since
this chemical was unavailable for the short period of time while
Chisso Corporation was shut-down, it affected the import/export
business of other companies and affected global trade.

28.  Relevant Literature

"Japan to Provide $100 Million for Firm that Polluted Bay", Chicago
Tribune, September 3, 1993.

"Japan:  New Approaches to the Environment".  Greenwatch.  UNESCO
Courier, July, 1994.

"Japan: Court Orders Firm to Pay $3 Million to Minamata's Victims".
Worldview, July 12, 1994.

"Mercurial Risks from Acid's Reign" by Janet Raloff.  New
Scientist.  Vol. 139, March 9, 1991

"Minamata and the Search for Justice" by Michael Cross.  New
Scientist.  February 16, 1991.

"Minamata's Heroes: Industry Poisoned Their Lives, but not Their
Spirits" by Chieko Kuriki, Chicago Tribune.  April 26, 1990.

"Pills, Pollution, and Power; Japan's Soiled Past" by Ralph S.
Yourtee.  World Paper, February, 1994.

Smith, Eugene.  Minamata.  New York:  Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1975.

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Bhopal Disaster

TED Case Studies

Bhopal Disaster

          CASE NUMBER:         233
       CASE MNEMONIC:      BHOPAL
       CASE NAME:          Bhopal Disaster

A.   IDENTIFICATION

1.   THE ISSUE

Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to industrial
crises.  However, industrial accidents such as Bhopal are not
just an Indian or even a Third World problem but are industrial
disasters waiting to happen , whether they are in the form of
"mini-Bhopals", smaller industrial accidents that occur with
disturbing frequency in chemical plants in both developed and
developing countries, and "slow-motion Bhopals", unseen chronic
poisoning from industrial pollution that causes irreversible
pain, suffering, and death (Weir, pp. xi-xii).  These are the key
issues we face in a world where toxins are used and developed
without fully knowing the harm that can come from their use or
abuse.

2.   DESCRIPTION

Developing countries, such as India, are particularly vulnerable
as they lack the infrastructure (e.g. communication, training,
education etc.) required to maintain technology but are
nevertheless, eager to set up and maintain industrial plants.  As
a result, they compete globally to attract multinational
companies for their investment and capital, and in this process,
often tend to ignore the safety and health violations that many
MNC's engage in.  "Developing countries confer upon MNC's a
competitive advantage because they offer low-cost labor, access
to markets, and lower operating costs.  Once there, companies
have little incentive to minimize environmental and human risks.
Lax environmental and safety regulation, inadequate capital
investment in safety equipment, and poor communications between
companies and governments compound the problem" (Cassels, p.279).

The Bhopal facility was part of India's Green Revolution aimed to
increase the productivity of crops.  Considered an essential
factor in the effort to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural
production, pesticide production use increased dramatically
during the late 1960's and early 1970's.  The decision to
manufacture the pesticides in India, as opposed to relying on
imports was based on India's goal of preserving foreign exchange
and its policy of industrialization (Cassels, p.39).  In 1969,
Union Carbide (UCC-the parent company) set up a small plant
(Union Carbide India Ltd.- UCIL) in Bhopal, the capital city of
Madhya Pradesh, to formulate pesticides.

Bhopal was chosen as the site for the Carbide plant because of
it's central location in India, a railway system that spanned the
country, a large lake which provided a reliable source of water,
and sufficient electricity and labor to sustain a large scale
industrial plant.  The MIC facility was located in the existing
Carbide plant to the north of the city, adjacent to an existing
residential neighborhood and barely two kilometers from the
railway station.  Union Carbide claims that the "squatter
settlements" around the plant arrived only after it did.
However, "all three of the worst-affected communities in the
disaster apparently existed before the Union Carbide plant
opened" (Weir, p.36).

Until 1979, the Indian subsidiary of Carbide used to import MIC
or methyl isocyanate from the parent company.  After 1979, it
started to manufacture its own MIC.  MIC is one of many
"intermediates" used in pesticide production and is a dangerous
chemical.  It is a little lighter than water but twice as heavy
as air, meaning that when it escapes into the atmosphere it
remains close to the ground.  It has the ability to react with
many substances:  water acids, metals, and the small deposits of
corrosive materials that accumulate in pipes, tanks, and valves.
The MIC in Bhopal was used for the production of various
pesticides, mainly Sevin brand carbaryl insecticide and Temik
brand aldicarb pesticide.  All the pesticides produced at UCIL
were sold in the Indian market.

According to many, Bhopal is the site of the greatest industrial
disaster in history.  On the night of December 23, 1984, a
dangerous chemical reaction  occurred in the Union Carbide
factory when a large amount of water got into the MIC storage
tank # 610.  The leak was first detected by workers about 11:30
p.m. when their eyes began to tear and burn.  They informed their
supervisor who failed to take action until it was too late.  In
that time, a large amount, about 40 tons of Methyl Isocyanate
(MIC), poured out of the tank for nearly two hours and escaped
into the air, spreading within eight kilometers downwind, over
the city of nearly 900,000.  Thousands of people were killed
(estimates ranging as high as 4,000) in their sleep or as they
fled in terror, and hundreds of thousands remain injured or
affected (estimates range as high as 400,000) to this day.  The
most seriously affected areas were the densely populated shanty
towns immediately surrounding the plant -- Jayaprakash Nagar,
Kazi Camp, Chola Kenchi, and the Railway Colony.  The victims
were almost entirely the poorest members of the population.

This poisonous gas, caused death and left the survivors with
lingering disability and diseases.  Not much is known about the
future medical damage of MIC, but according to an international
medical commission, the victims suffer from serious health
problems that are being misdiagnosed or ignored by local doctors
(Lancet, "Round...").

Exposure to MIC has resulted in damage to the eyes and lungs and
has caused respiratory ailments such as chronic bronchitis and
emphysema, gastrointestinal problems like hyperacidity and
chronic gastritis, ophthalmic problems like chronic
conjunctivitis and early cataracts, vision problems, neurological
disorders such as memory and motor skills, psychiatric problems
of various types including varying grades of anxiety and
depression, musculoskeletal problems and gynecological problems
among the victims.  It is estimated that children born in Bhopal
after the disaster face twice the risk of dying as do children
elsewhere, partly because parents cannot care for them
adequately.  Surprisingly enough, despite the serious health
problems and the deaths that have occurred, Union Carbide claims
that the MIC is merely a "mild throat and ear irritant" (Lancet,
"Round..." p.952).

The Bhopal disaster was the result of a combination of legal,
technological, organizational, and human errors.  The immediate
cause of the chemical reaction was the seepage of water (500
liters)into the MIC storage tank.  The results of this reaction
were exacerbated by the failure of containment and safety
measures and by a complete absence of community information and
emergency procedures.  The long term effects were made worse by
the absence of systems to care for and compensate the victims.

Furthermore, safety standards and maintenance procedures at the
plant had been deteriorating and ignored for months.  A listing
of the defects of the MIC unit runs as follows:

  -Gauges measuring temperature and pressure in the various
  parts of the unit, including the crucial MIC storage tanks,
  were so notoriously unreliable that workers ignored early
  signs of trouble (Weir, pp.41-42).

  -The refrigeration unit for keeping MIC at low temperatures
  (and therefore less likely to undergo overheating and
  expansion should a contaminant enter the tank) had been shut
  off for some time (Weir, pp.41-42).

  -The gas scrubber, designed to neutralize any escaping MIC,
  had been shut off for maintenance.  Even had it been
  operative, post-disaster inquiries revealed, the maximum
  pressure it could handle was only one-quarter that which was
  actually reached in the accident (Weir, pp.41-42).

  -The flare tower, designed to burn off MIC escaping from the
  scrubber, was also turned off, waiting for replacement of a
  corroded piece of pipe.  The tower, however, was
  inadequately designed for its task, as it was capable of
  handling only a quarter of the volume of gas released (Weir,
  pp.41-42).

  -The water curtain, designed to neutralize any remaining
  gas, was too short to reach the top of the flare tower, from
  where the MIC was billowing (Weir, pp.41-42).

  -The lack of effective warning systems; the alarm on the
  storage tank failed to signal the increase in temperature on
  the night of the disaster (Cassels, p.19).

  -MIC storage tank number 610 was filled beyond recommended
  capacity; and

  -a storage tank which was supposed to be held in reserve for
  excess MIC already contained the MIC (Cassels, p.19).

Ironically, in Bhopal, the people living around the Union Carbide
plant were warned of potential hazards in a series of local
newspaper articles, but residents ignored these warnings because
they did not know how to react to them, while local officials
dismissed them as sensationalist reporting (Technology Review,
p.73).

Interestingly enough, Carbide tried to hide its poor safety and
maintenance record along with the other faults already mentioned,
by claiming publicly that the company was the victim of sabotage
by a 'disgruntled employee'.  Yet, Carbide didn't release the
name of this employee or bring charges against him/her.  However,
there is evidence to the contrary which supports the view that
Carbide (both the parent company and its Indian subsidiary) was
a negligent company that failed to improve its deteriorating
plant.  Incidentally, in a report (May 1982) of the Indian
subsidiary conducted by a three-member safety team from the Union
Carbide headquarters in the U.S., indicated that "a serious
potential for sizeable releases of toxic materials in the MIC
unit either due to equipment failure, operating problems, or
maintenance problems thus requiring various changes to reduce the
danger of the plant; there is no evidence the recommendations
were ever implemented" (Weir, pp.40-41).

Furthermore, "Carbide persistently shows 'wanton and wilful
disregard for the health and safety of its workers and the
communities in which it operates'"(New Statesman and Society,
"Surviving..." p.5).  Additionally, a scientific report published
by two U.S. organizations, the National Toxic Campaign and the
international  Council on Public Affairs, Union Carbide continues
to be " 'a major discharger of toxic substances into the
environment, and a major generator of hazardous waste'.  In 1988,
the company generated more than 300 million pounds of hazardous
waste - an increase of 70 million compared with 1987" (New
Statesman and Society, "Surviving..." p.5).

Carbide had dropped the safety standards at the Bhopal plant well
below those it maintained at a nearly identical facility in West
Virginia.  It is also important to note here that Carbide was
able to operate its deteriorating plant  because industrial
safety and environmental laws and regulations were lacking or
were not strictly enforced by the state of Madhya Pradesh or the
Indian government making them indirectly responsible for the
tragedy at Bhopal.

3.   RELATED CASES

  VEAL case
  EUMEAT case
  ECFURBAN case
  BASEL case
  CHERNOB case
  BASMEX case

  Keyword Clusters      

  (1): Impact                   = INDIA
  (2): Bio-geography            = TROPical
  (3): Environmental Problem    = HEALTH

4.   DRAFT AUTHOR:  Trupti Patel

B.   LEGAL CLUSTER

5.   DISCOURSE AND STATUS: DISagreement and COMPlete

This disaster gave rise to the world's largest lawsuit, one that
spanned half-way around the world and dragged on for more than
seven years.  Although the final settlement ($470 million)
satisfied the imperatives of the company and the Government of
India, it was condemned by the victims (Cassels, preface).

For years after the tragedy, the delay in delivering final
compensation to the victims has further propagated the suffering
to the victims.  Furthermore, other elements of relief ordered by
the Indian Supreme Court haven't been implemented.  These are the
medical surveillance program, the contingency insurance and the
new hospital.  There has been much dissent and several
organizations have voiced that the settlement  with Union
Carbide, made on behalf of the victims by the Indian government,
should be voided.  These petitioners argue that the Indian court
had no authority to dismiss criminal charges or grant immunity
against future charges, to Union Carbide since pleas bargaining
is not permitted under Indian law.

The petitioners also argued that while the settlement amount was
based on an estimated 40,000 severely injured victims, medical
studies suggest the number may be closer to 400,000 (Forbes, "The
ghost..." p.108).  Also, many medical experts believe that
liability to provide adequate compensation and facilities for the
handicapped victims requiring long-term follow up and treatment
should rest with Union Carbide Corporation and not with the
Indian Government (Lancet, "Round..." p.952).  Moreover, more
than 250,000 claims were never documented or classified, making
it hard for these victims to obtain compensation.  Much to the
anger and outrage of these groups and victims and the relief of
Union Carbide, on October 1991, the Indian Supreme Court upheld
the Bhopal settlement of $470 million dollars.  Many feel that
this is a clear signal from the Indian government that MNC's
investing in the country will receive only a "slap on the wrist"
in the event that something like this happens again.

6.   FORUM AND SCOPE:  INDIA and BILATeral

Issues of jurisdiction were central to the legal battle that
followed the tragedy.  These centered around the relationship of
the parent Union Carbide Corporation to its Indian subsidiary and
the appropriateness of the place where litigation is being
conducted.  Union Carbide Corporation maintains that it's
subsidiary is separate from the parent company and so it only
should be liable instead of the whole corporation.  The Indian
government's petition argues that insofar as Union Carbide
designed, constructed, owned, and operated the plant from which
the chemical escaped, the company should be held absolutely
liable for all the resulting damage.  Second, the company, in
undertaking an activity that it knew was ultra-hazardous to the
public at large, is strictly liable for the harm that was the
material consequence of such activity, regardless of whether the
harm that resulted was through fault of another or its own
negligence.  Third, the company was negligent in designing,
constructing, operating and maintaining its plant and thus,
failed to exercise its duty of care to protect the public from
the dangers inherent in its plant and processes (Morehouse and
Subramaniam, pp. 81-82).

Lawsuits were filed in both U.S. and Indian courts but
ultimately, it was decided that the case should be tried in an
Indian court.  Lawsuits filed in U.S. courts related to the
Bhopal case were refused on the grounds that the immediate
location of  the accident was in India, the victims were Indian,
and he U.S. connection with its Indian affiliate did not appear
to give it an unusual degree of control.

7.   DECISION BREADTH: 2

8.   LEGAL STANDING:  LAW

Following the disaster, the Government of India passed the Bhopal
Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985.  The Act gave
power to the Central Government to represent all claimants in
appropriate forums, appoint a Welfare Commissioner and other
staff and to discharge duties connected with hearing of the
claims and distribution of compensation.  Under this Act, in
1985, the Government formulated a scheme known as the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster Scheme, for the registration, processing, and
determination of compensation to each claim and appeals arising
from thereon.

Since the tragedy, the victims have waged an "unrequited struggle
for justice, but they have been ill-served by the Indian
government, which failed to pursue the victims' case aggressively
in the Indian courts, opting instead to go easy on Union Carbide
and maintain a favorable investment climate" (New Statesman and
Society, "Toxin..." p.18). Union Carbide settled out of court for
$470 million, thus avoiding any damaging legal precedent or
liability. In return, India's Supreme Court ordered the dismissal
of all civil and criminal charges against Carbide and its
officers, and gave them immunity from future prosecution.  The
Supreme Court felt that in this case, the victims needed
immediate relief, not further legal delay.

International Law at present plays almost no role in a Bhopal
scenario.  Substantive international law remains weak in the area
of pollution, industrial hazards, and multinational business
regulation (Weir, p.46).  An international treaty is needed under
which it would be agreed that, if courts in a signatory country
award compensation after due process of law, then the award would
automatically be enforced by courts in other signatory countries
(Economist, p.70).

C.   GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTER

9.   GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS

  a.   DOMAIN:  ASIA
  b.   SITE:  South Asia [SASIA]
  c.   IMPACT:  INDIA    

10.  SUB-NATIONAL FACTORS:  NO

11.  TYPE OF HABITAT: TROPical

D.   TRADE CLUSTER

12.  TYPE OF MEASURE: Regulatory Standard [REGSTD]

With regard to process standards, it is apparent that Union
Carbide had double standards when operating its plant in India
and in West Virginia.  An investigation of both the UCIL plant
and its counterpart in Institute, West Virginia revealed  that
"while the latter plant had computerized warning and monitoring
system, the former relied on manual gauges and the human senses
to detect gas leaks.  The capacity of the storage tanks, gas
scrubbers, and flare tower was greater at the Institute plant.
Finally, emergency evacuation plans were in place in Institute,
but nonexistent in Bhopal" (Cassel, p.19).  Also, the manner in
which Carbide decided to manufacture MIC was questioned at the
design stage when a controversy arose regarding the question of
whether substantial storage capacity or nominal storage of MIC
would be required.  UCC, which provided the basic design of the
plant, supervised its engineering, and defined operating
procedures to run it, insisted on the former [despite the fact
that] UCIL felt that the latter was...inherently safer (Morehouse
and Subramaniam, p.3).

13.  DIRECT OR INDIRECT:  DIRECT

14.  RELATION OF MEASURE TO IMPACT

  a.  DIRECTLY RELATED:    Yes  CHEMical
  b.  INDIRECTLY RELATED:  No
  c.  NOT RELATED:         No
  d.  PROCESS RELATED:     Yes Health

15.  TRADE PRODUCTION IDENTIFICATION: CHEMical

16.  ECONOMIC DATA

Estimates of the number dead and injured vary widely.  Poor
documentation, mass burials and cremations, and conflicting
medical opinions ensure that the precise number will never be
known.  In addition, death records may not include homeless and
transient individuals who perished.  The original count of the
dead was more than 2,000.  By 1987, the official death toll stood
at about 3,500 and by 1992, it was over 4,000.  Victims'
organizations placed the figure many thousands higher.  In
addition, 30,000 to 40,000 people were maimed and seriously
injured, and 200,000 were otherwise affected through minor
injury, death of a family member, and economic and social
dislocation (Cassels, p.5).

17.  IMPACT OF TRADE RESTRICTION: LOW

18.  INDUSTRY SECTOR: CHEMical

19.  EXPORTER AND IMPORTER: USA and INDIA

D.   ENVIRONMENT CLUSTERS

20.  ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM TYPE: Pollution Air [POLA]

Not very much is known about the environmental impacts of the gas
leak from the Bhopal plant.  The Indian Council of Agricultural
Research has issued a preliminary report on damage to crops,
vegetables, animals, and fish from the accidents, but these offer
few conclusive findings since they were reported in the early
stages after the disaster. This report however, did indicate that
the impact of whatever toxic substances emerged from the Carbide
plant were highly lethal on exposed animals.  Large number of
cattle (estimates range as high as 4,000), as well as dogs, cats,
and birds were killed.  Plant life was also severely damaged by
exposure to the gas.  There was also widespread defoliation of
trees, especially in low lying areas (Morehouse and Subramaniam,
pp.36-38).

21.  SPECIES INFORMATION

  SPECIES:       Homosapiens
  GENERA:        NA
  DIVERSITY:     NA

22.  IMPACT AND EFFECT:  HIGH and PRODuct

23.  URGENCY AND LIFETIME: LOW and 70 years

24.  SUBSTITUTES:: Biodegradable products [BIODG]

E.   OTHER FACTORS

25.  CULTURE:  NO

There appear to be have been serious communication problems and
management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian operation.
This failure to communicate hazards was the result of the parent'
companies hands-off approach to its overseas operation, and can
be traced to cross-cultural barriers.  These can possibly be
related to "disruptions and flaws which appear in multinational
operations because of "the absence of common values, norms, and
expectations among managers in different nations, from tendencies
towards ethnocentric attitudes, from psychological impediments to
cross-cultural understanding, and from obstructions and
deficiencies in the flow of information within the transnational
system attributable to distance and shared ownership.  The fact
that the operating manuals at Bhopal were printed only in English
is an emblematic example of these problems (Cassels, p.21).

26.  TRANS-BOUNDARY ISSUES:: NO

27.  HUMAN RIGHTS:  YES

In mid-July 1985, the government of India Health Minister stated
that 36 pregnant women had spontaneously aborted, 21 babies were
born with deformities, and there were 27 stillbirths, all
suspected to have been caused by the poison gas leak in Bhopal.
An examination of 114 women in the field clinics in two of the
gas affected slums in Bhopal three months after the disaster
revealed that an extremely high proportion of these women had
developed gynecological diseases such as leucorrhoea (90%),
pelvic inflammatory disease (79%), cervical erosion and/or
endocervicitis (75%), excessive menstrual bleeding since exposure
to the gas (31%), and suppression of lactation (59%).  Also,
there were several thousand pregnant women in the communities
that were among the worst affected by the gas.  Respiratory
complication and the resulting hypozyia were bound to affect the
fetuses as much as it did the mothers (Morehouse and Subramaniam,
pp. 33-4).